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Abstract
In cosmology, we would like to explain our observations and predict future
observations from theories of the entire universe. Such cosmological theories
make ontological assumptions of what entities exist and what their properties
and relationships are. One must also make epistemological assumptions or
metatheories of how one can test cosmological theories. Here I shall propose a
Bayesian analysis in which the likelihood of a complete theory is given by the
normalized measure it assigns to the observation used to test the theory. In
this context, a discussion is given of the trade-off between prior probabilities
and likelihoods, of the measure problem of cosmology, of the death of Born’s
rule, of the Boltzmann brain problem, of whether there is a better principle for
prior probabilities than mathematical simplicity, and of an Optimal Argument
for the Existence of God.
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1 Introduction
Cosmology is the study of the entire universe. Ideally in science, one would like
the simplest possible theory from which one could logically deduce a complete de-
scription of the universe. Such theories must make implicit assumptions about the
ontology of the universe, what are its existing entities and their nature. They may
also make implicit assumptions about the ontology of the entire world (all that ex-
ists), particularly if other entities beyond the universe have relationships with the
universe.
For example, I am a Christian who believes that the universe was created by
an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, personal God who exists outside it but
who relates to it as His creation. Therefore, the ontology I assume for the world
includes not only our universe but also God and other entities He may have created
(such as new heavens and new earth for us after death). However, my assumption
that God has created our universe as an entity essentially separate from Himself
means that one can also look for a theory of the universe itself, without including
its relationship to God, though there may be some aspects of such a theory that can
only be explained by the assumption that the universe was created by God. (For
example, even though a complete theory of our universe would necessarily imply the
facts that there is life and consciousness within it, since such entities do exist within
our universe, there may not be a good explanation of these aspects of the theory
apart from the concept of creation by a personal God.)
Here I shall focus on theories of our universe as a separate entity, though near
the end I shall speculate on some possible deeper explanations for why our universe
is as it is.
I shall define a complete theory for a universe to be one that completely de-
scribes or specifies all properties of that universe. I shall assume that an observer
who could observe all properties of a universe and who has unlimited reasoning
power could deduce a unique complete theory for that universe. (Equivalent com-
plete descriptions of the theory I regard as the same theory. Depending upon one’s
background knowledge and the effort needed to deduce consequences from logically
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equivalent assumptions, different equivalent complete descriptions may be assigned
different levels of simplicity when one seeks the simplest complete description, but
that involves subjective elements that I shall not get into here.)
Of course, we do not know for certain what is the unique complete theory of our
universe. What we can know and how we can know it is the subject of epistemology.
Some of the complications of realistic epistemology arise from the limited reason-
ing powers of humans, such as the fact that we cannot deduce all the consequences
of a set of axioms. (For example, the axioms of arithmetic and of complex numbers
presumably imply whether the Riemann hypothesis is true or false, but so far hu-
mans have not been able to find a rigorous deduction of which is the case.) To avoid
all the complications of limited reasoning power, for simplicity I shall just consider
idealized cases in which observations are limited but reasoning powers are not.
Despite this idealization, we are also restricted by the fact that our observations
are limited and do not show the entire universe. A limited observation does not
imply a unique complete theory for a universe.
Therefore, beings like us with limited observations within the universe cannot
hope to attain absolute certainty about a complete theory for the universe. The
most we might hope for are posterior probabilities for different complete theories,
probabilities taking into account our partial observations. But even the idealized
observer cannot deduce the posterior probabilities of different theories fitting his or
her partial observations without making subjective choices for the prior probabilities
of these different theories.
Here I shall lump all of the information accessible to the idealized observer when
he or she assigns posterior probabilities to different theories into a single observation
Ok, which includes memory elements of what in ordinary language one might con-
sider to be many previous observations. The observation Ok represents all that the
idealized observer knows about the universe before coming up with various complete
theories Ti to explain this observation and to which the idealized observer wishes to
assign posterior probabilities P (Ti|Ok) for the theory Ti that are conditional upon
the observation Ok.
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2 A Bayesian Analysis for the Probabilities of
Theories
Consider theories Ti that for each possible observation Ok give a probability for that
observation, P (Ok|Ti). This of course is generically not the same as the probability
P (Ti|Ok) of the theory given the observation, which is a goal of science to calculate.
If we assign (subjective) prior probabilities P (Ti) to the theories Ti (presumably
higher for simpler theories, by Occam’s razor) and use an observation Ok to test the
theory, P (Ok|Ti) is then the likelihood of the theory, and by Bayes’ theorem we can
calculate the posterior probability of the theory as
P (Ti|Ok) =
P (Ti)P (Ok|Ti)
∑
j P (Tj)P (Ok|Tj)
. (1)
We would like to get this posterior probability as high as possible by choosing a
simple theory (high prior probability P (Ti)) that gives a good statistical fit to one’s
observation Ok (high likelihood P (Ok|Ti)).
Since a complete theory for a universe should completely specify all properties
of that universe with certainty, one might think that it has no room for probabilities
between 0 and 1, so that all likelihoods P (Ok|Ti) would be 0 or 1. Then the posterior
probabilities of these theories, given the observation Ok, would just be proportional
to the prior probabilities of the theories Ti that give P (Ok|Ti) = 1.
For observations to play a bigger role in science, we would like a way of getting
a range of likelihoods, 0 < P (Ok|Ti) < 1. If the theories can give normalizable
measures for the observations, then the normalized measures can be interpreted to
be likelihoods P (Ok|Ti) that can vary between 0 and 1.
In a classical theory, the measures could be functionals of the phase-space trajec-
tory, such as the times that the system spends in different regions of the phase space.
In a quantum theory, the measures could be certain functionals of the quantum state
(maps from the quantum state to nonnegative numbers).
Another argument against likelihoods all zero or one is the following: If a specific
theory Ti leads to the definite existence of more than one observation Oj, one might
be tempted to say that P (Oj|Ti) = 1 for all of these observations, giving unit
likelihood for any theory Ti predicting the definite existence of the particular actual
observation Ok used to test the theory. However, this procedure would mean that
one could construct a theory of maximum (unit) likelihood, no matter what the
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observation turns out to be, just by having the theory predict that all possible
observations definitely exist. But this seems to be too cheap, supposedly explaining
everything but actually explaining nothing.
Therefore, I propose the normalization principle or metatheory that each theory
Ti should give normalized probabilities for the different possible observations Oj that
it predicts, so that for each Ti, the sum of P (Oj|Ti) over all Oj is unity.
One could view theory construction as a contest, in which theorists are given only
unit probabilistic resources to divide at will for each theory, and then others judge
the theories by assigning prior probabilities to the theories based on their simplicity.
Normalizing the products of these prior probabilities and of the probabilities the
theories assign to the observation used to test the theory then gives the posterior
probabilities of the theories.
For this to be a fair contest, each theory should be allowed a unit probability
to distribute among all the observations predicted by the theory. Of course, if the
theorists cheat and give unnormalized probabilities in their theories (such as assign-
ing probabilities near one for more than one observation in the same theory), the
judges can compensate for that by assigning correspondingly lower prior probabil-
ities to such theories. However, it would give a more clear division between prior
probabilities and likelihoods if theorists obeyed the proposed rules and normalized
the observational probabilities for each theory so that they sum to one.
3 Trade-Off Between Prior Probabilities and
Likelihoods
In a Bayesian analysis, we have (1) prior probabilities P (Ti) for theories (intrinsic
plausibilities), (2) conditional probabilities P (Ok|Ti) for observations (‘likelihoods’
of the theories for a fixed observation), and (3) posterior probabilities P (Ti|Ok) ∝
P (Ti)P (Ok|Ti) for theories Ti, conditionalized upon the observation Ok.
Prior probabilities are subjective, usually higher for simpler theories. The highest
prior probability might be for the theory T1 that nothing concrete (contingent) exists,
but then P (Ok|T1) = 0. T2 might be the theory that all observations exist equally:
P (Ok|T2) = 1/∞ = 0 when normalized (e.g., modal realism).
At the other extreme would be a maximal-likelihood theory giving P (Ok|Ti) = 1
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for one’s observation Ok (and zero probability for all other observations), but this
seems to require a very complex theory Ti that might be assigned an extremely tiny
prior probability P (Ti), hence giving a very low posterior P (Ti|Ok).
Thus there is a trade off between prior probabilities and likelihoods, that is,
between intrinsic plausibility and fit to observations.
4 The Measure Problem of Cosmology
The measure problem of cosmology (see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4]) is how to obtain probabil-
ities of observations from the quantum state of the universe. This is particularly a
problem when eternal inflation leads to a universe of unbounded size so that there
are apparently infinitely many realizations or occurrences of observations of each
of many different kinds or types, making the ratios ambiguous. There is also the
danger of domination by Boltzmann Brains, observers produced by thermal and/or
vacuum fluctuations [5, 6, 7, 8].
The measure problem is related to the measurement problem of quantum theory,
how to relate quantum reality to our observations that appear to be much more
classical. An approach I shall take is to assume that observations are fundamentally
conscious perceptions or sentient experiences (each perception being all that one is
consciously aware of at once).
I shall take an Everettian view that the wavefunction never collapses, so in the
Heisenberg picture, there is one single fixed quantum state for the universe (which
could be a ‘multiverse’). I assume that instead of ‘many worlds,’ there are instead
many different actually existing observations (sentient experiences) Ok, but that they
have different positive measures, µk = µ(Ok), which are in some sense how much
the various observations occur, but they are not determined by just the contents of
the observations.
For simplicity, I shall assume that there is a countable discrete set {Ok} of
observations, and that the total measure
∑
k µk is normalized to unity for each
possible complete theory Ti that gives the normalized measures µk for all possible
observations Ok. Then for a Bayesian analysis, I shall interpret the normalized
measures µk of the observation Ok that each theory Ti gives as the probability of
that observation given the theory, P (Ok|Ti), which for one’s observation Ok is the
‘likelihood’ of the theory Ti.
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5 Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless Sen-
sationalism
The map from the quantum state to the measures of observations could be nonlinear.
However, I assume a linear relationship in Sensible Quantum Mechanics [9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15] (which I have also called Mindless Sensationalism because it proposes
that what is fundamental is not minds but conscious perceptions, which crudely
might be called ‘sensations,’ though they include more of what one is consciously
aware of, e.g., memories, than what is usually called ‘sensations’):
µ(Ok) = σ[A(Ok)] ≡ expectation value of the operator A(Ok). (2)
Here σ is the quantum state of the universe (a positive linear functional of
quantum operators), and A(Ok) is a nonnegative ‘awareness operator’ corresponding
to the observation or sentient experience (conscious perception) Ok. The quantum
state σ (which could be a pure state, a mixed state given by a density matrix, or
a C*-algebra state) and the awareness operators {A(Ok)} (along with the linear
relationship above and a description of the contents of each Ok) are all given by the
theory Ti.
6 The Death of the Born Rule
Traditional quantum theory uses the Born rule with the probability of the obser-
vation Ok being the expectation value of A(Ok) = Pk that is a projection operator
(PjPk = δjkPk, no sum over k) corresponding to the observation Ok, so
P (Ok|Ti) = σi[Pk] = 〈Pk〉i. (3)
Born’s rule works when one knows where the observer is within the quantum
state (e.g., in the quantum state of a single laboratory rather than of the universe),
so that one has definite orthonormal projection operators. However, Born’s rule
does not work in a universe large enough that there may be identical copies of the
observer at different locations, since then the observer does not know uniquely the
location or what the projection operators are [16, 17, 18, 19].
Why does the Born rule die? Suppose there are two identical copies of the ob-
server, at locations B and C, that can each make the observations O1 and O2 (which
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do not reveal the location). Born’s rule would give the probabilities PB
1
= σ[PB
1
]
and PB
2
= σ[PB
2
] if the observer knew that it were at location B with the projec-
tion operators there being PB
1
and PB
2
. Similarly, it would give the probabilities
PC
1
= σ[PC
1
] and PC
2
= σ[PC
2
] if the observer knew that it were at location C with
the projection operators there being PC
1
and PC
2
.
However, if the observer is not certain to be at either B or C, and if PB
1
< PC
1
,
then one should have PB
1
< P1 < P
C
1
. But there is no state-independent projection
operator that gives an expectation value with this property for all possible quantum
states. No matter what the orthonormal projection operators P1 and P2 are, there
is an open set of states that gives expectation values that are not positively weighted
means of the observational probabilities at the two locations. Thus the Born rule
fails in cosmology.
In more detail, consider normalized pure quantum states of the form
|ψ〉 = b12|12〉+ b21|21〉, (4)
with arbitrary normalized complex amplitudes b12 and b21. The component |12〉
represents the observation 1 in the region B and the observation 2 in the region C;
the component |21〉 represents the observation 2 in the region B and 1 in the region
C. Therefore, PB
1
= PC
2
= |b12|
2, and PB
2
= PC
1
= |b21|
2.
For Born’s rule to give the possibility of both observational probabilities’ being
nonzero in the two-dimensional quantum state space being considered, the orthonor-
mal projection operators must each be of rank one, of the form
P1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, P2 = |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, (5)
where |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are two orthonormal pure states.
Once the state-independent projection operators are fixed, then if the quantum
state is |ψ〉 = |ψ1〉, the expectation values of the two projection operators are 〈P1〉 ≡
〈ψ|P1|ψ〉 = 〈ψ1|ψ1〉〈ψ1|ψ1〉 = 1 and 〈P2〉 ≡ 〈ψ|P2|ψ〉 = 〈ψ1|ψ2〉〈ψ2|ψ1〉 = 0. These
extreme values of 1 and 0 are not positively weighted means of PB
1
and PC
1
and of
PC
2
and PC
2
for any choice of |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 and any normalized choice of positive
weights. Therefore, no matter what the orthonormal projection operators P1 and
P2 are, there is at least one quantum state (and actually an open set of states) that
gives expectation values that are not positively weighted means of the observational
probabilities at the two locations. Thus Born’s rule fails.
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The failure of the Born rule means that in a theory Ti, the awareness operators
Ai(Ok), whose expectation values in the quantum state σi of the universe give the
probabilities or normalized measures for the observations or sentient experiences Ok
as P (Ok|Ti) ≡ µi(Ok) = σi[Ai(Ok)] ≡ 〈Ai(Ok)〉i, cannot be projection operators.
However, the awareness operators could be weighted sums or integrals over space-
time of localized projection operators Pi(Ok, x) at locations denoted schematically
by x, say onto brain states there that would produce the observations or sentient
experiences.
7 The Boltzmann Brain Problem
In local quantum field theory with a definite globally hyperbolic spacetime, any pos-
itive localized operator (such as a localized projection operator) will have a strictly
positive expectation value in any nonpathological quantum state. Therefore, if such
a positive localized operator is integrated with uniform weight over a spacetime
with infinite 4-volume, it will give an awareness operator with an infinite expecta-
tion value.
If one takes the integral only up to some finite cutoff time tc and normalizes
the resulting awareness operators, then for a universe that continues forever with
a 3-volume bounded below by a positive value, the integrals will be dominated
by times of the same order of magnitude as the cutoff time. If at late times the
probability per 4-volume drops very low for ordinary observers, then most of the
measure for observations will be contributed by thermal or vacuum fluctuations,
so-called Boltzmann brains. That is, Boltzmann brains will dominate the measure
for observations.
If Boltzmann brains dominate the measure for observations, one might ask, “So
what?” Couldn’t it be that our observations are those of ordinary observers? Or
couldn’t it be that our observations really are those of Boltzmann brains? However,
since Boltzmann brain observations are produced mainly by thermal or vacuum fluc-
tuations, it would be expected that only a very tiny fraction of their measure would
be for observations so ordered as our observations. This very tiny fraction, plus the
even smaller fraction of ordered ordinary observer observations in comparison with
the dominant disordered Boltzmann brain observations, would be only a very tiny
fraction of the measure of all observations. Thus the normalized probability of one of
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our ordered observations (which we would use as the likelihood of the theory) would
be highly diluted and hence much smaller than those of alternative theories in which
Boltzmann brains do not dominate. If these alternative theories do not have prior
probabilities that are too small, they would dominate the posterior probabilities.
In summary, Boltzmann brain domination, which is predicted by many simple
extensions of current theories (e.g., with the awareness operators or their equivalent
being obtained by a uniform integration over spacetime up to a cutoff that is then
taken to infinity), gives a reductio ad absurdum for such theories, making their
likelihoods very small. Surely there are alternative theories that avoid Boltzmann
brain domination without such a cost of complexity that their prior probabilities
would be decreased so much as the gain in likelihoods from not having the normalized
probabilities of our ordered observations highly diluted by disordered Boltzmann
brain observations.
The Boltzmann brain problem is analogous to the ultraviolet catastrophe of late
19th century classical physics: Physicists then did not believe that an ideal black
body in thermal equilibrium would really emit infinite power, and physicists now do
not believe that Boltzmann brains really dominate observations.
8 Volume Weighting versus Volume Averaging
The approach that gives ‘awareness operators’ as uniform integrals over spacetime
of localized projection operators (or equivalently counts all observation occurrences
equally, not matter when and where they occur in a spacetime) gives an especially
severe Boltzmann brain problem in spacetimes with a positive cosmological con-
stant (as ours seems to have) with the spatial hypersurfaces having 3-volumes that
asymptotically grow exponentially, as in the k = 1 slicing of the de Sitter spacetime.
At each time, counting the number or measure of observations as growing with the
volume is called ‘volume weighting.’
In 2008 I proposed the alternative of Volume Averaging [20, 21], which gives a
contribution to the measure for an observation from a hypersurface that is propor-
tional to the spatial density of the occurrences of the observation on the hypersurface.
This rewards the spatial frequency of observation occurrences rather than the total
number that would diverge in eternal inflation as the hypersurface volume is taken
to infinity.
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Volume Averaging ameliorates the Boltzmann brain problem by not giving more
weight to individual spatial hypersurfaces at very late times when Boltzmann brains
might be expected to dominate. However, when one integrates over a sequence of
hypersurface with a measure uniform in the element of proper time dt, one gets a
divergence if the time t goes to infinity. One needs some suppression at late times
to avoid this divergence.
In 2010 I proposed Agnesi Weighting [22], replacing dt by dt/(1 + t2) where t is
measured in Planck units. This year I have also proposed new measures depending
on the Spacetime Average Density (SAD) of observation occurrences within a proper
time t from a big bang or bounce [4]. When these measures are combined with
Volume Averaging and a suitable quantum state such as my Symmetric-Bounce one
[23], they appear to be statistically consistent with all observations and seem to
give much higher likelihoods than current measures using the extreme view that the
measure is just given by the quantum state.
9 Is There a Better Principle than Mathematical
Simplicity?
Mathematical simplicity seems to be a reasonably good guide in science for choosing
prior probabilities. However, once observations are taken into account with the like-
lihoods, the highest posterior probabilities do not seem to go to the mathematically
absolutely simplest theories (such as the theory that nothing concrete exists, which
has zero likelihood given the fact that we observe something concrete, something
not logically necessary).
Is there another principle that works better for predicting or explaining the
properties of the actual world?
A conjectured principle for explaining the properties of the world is the following
[24]:
The actual world is the best possible world.
By the best possible world, I mean the one with maximum goodness. I take
the goodness that is maximized to be the pleasantness (measure of pleasure) of
conscious or sentient experiences, which is what I am calling their intrinsic goodness.
Conscious experiences of pleasure (happiness, joy, contentment, satisfaction, etc.)
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would have positive goodness. Conscious experiences of displeasure (unhappiness,
pain, agony, discontentment, dissatisfaction, etc.) would have negative goodness.
Our universe seems to have enormous positive goodness, but it also seems to
have enormous negative goodness. Our universe also seems to have a very high de-
gree of mathematical elegance and beauty. Humans can partially appreciate this, so
that helps increase goodness. But it would seem that intrinsic goodness consciously
experienced by humans would be higher if disasters, disease, and cruelty were elim-
inated, even at the cost of less mathematical elegance and beauty for the laws of
physics.
10 The Optimal Argument for the Existence of
God
If the mathematical elegance of the universe were appreciated by a sentient Being
outside the universe, that might increase the goodness of the world to a maximum,
despite the sufferings within it. Goodness might be maximized if the Being had
all possible knowledge, leading to the hypothesis of omniscience for full appreci-
ation. Maximum goodness might also suggest the hypothesis that the Being has
omnipotence for actualizing the best possible world. If the Being actualizes a world
of maximum goodness, one might postulate that the Being is a Creator and has
omnibenevolence. Such an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent Creator would
fit the usual criteria for God.
Thus the assumption that the world has maximum goodness might suggest the
conclusion of the existence of God:
Without God, it would seem that the goodness of the universe could be in-
creased by violations of the laws of physics whenever such violations would lead to
more pleasure within the universe. However, with God, such violations might de-
crease God’s pleasure so much that total goodness would be decreased. Perhaps the
actual world does maximize total goodness, despite suffering that is a consequence
of elegant laws.
God may grieve over unpleasant consequences of elegant laws of physics and
might even directly experience all of them Himself (as symbolized by the terrible
suffering He experienced in the Crucifixion), but there may be that inevitable trade
12
off that God takes into account in maximizing total goodness. If God really does
maximize total goodness, He is doing what is best.
Let me give a draft syllogism for one form of this Optimal Argument for the
Existence of God:
Assumptions:
1. The world is described by the simple hypothesis that it is the best, maximizing
the pleasure within it.
2. It is most plausible that either (a) our universe exists in isolation, or (b) our
universe is created by God whose pleasure is affected by the universe and who has
a nature determining what gives Him pleasure.
3. Our universe could have had more pleasure.
4. If God exists, it is possible that the total pleasure of the world (including both
that within our universe and within God) is maximized subject to the constraint of
His nature.
Conclusions:
5. If our universe exists in isolation, 3 implies that it could have had more
pleasure and hence the world could have been better, contradicting 1.
6. Therefore, 1 and 3 imply that option (a) of 2 is false.
7. Then 2 and 4 implies that it is most plausible that God exists and created
our universe.
Of course, the assumptions of this argument are highly speculative, so it certainly
does not give a proof of the existence of God from universally accepted axioms. It
is merely suggestive, hopefully motivating further investigations of other evidence,
such as of historical records about the founders and key events in the development
of the world religions.
Assumption 1 is motivated by Occam’s razor but is modified slightly from the
typical scientific form that one seeks theories that have the simplest mathematical
formulation. That form seems to work well when one constrains theories by ob-
servations, but it does not seem to give a fundamental explanation as to why our
universe appears to be described by relatively simple mathematics but not the sim-
plest possible mathematics. In making the assumption of the best world, I assume
that goodness is fundamentally given by the measure of pleasure (the pleasantness)
of conscious experiences (with displeasure counting negatively).
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Assumption 2 is highly debatable, since there are many other possibilities that
people have considered. Unless I made an expansion to include other possibilities,
my argument might seem worthwhile mainly to those who are trying to choose
between these two options.
Assumption 3 does seem rather obviously in agreement with our observations,
at least if one considers all alternative logical possibilities for our universe.
Assumption 4 could be true in various different ways. A traditional free-will
defense of the problem of evil might assume that God gets sufficient pleasure from
having persons in His universe with libertarian free will (e.g., so that they can
love Him freely), so that such a world maximizes the total pleasure of God and of
His creatures despite the sufferings (displeasures, which I am counting at negative
pleasures) within the universe. I am personally sceptical that it is logically possible
for God to create totally from nothing creatures with libertarian free will, so I
would instead postulate that God gets sufficient pleasure from a universe almost
always obeying highly orderly and elegant laws of nature that He generally uses in
His creation, so that the total pleasure of all conscience experiences (those of both
God and His creatures) is maximized despite the sufferings that both God and His
creatures also experience. But one might also consider other alternative ways to
flesh out how Assumption 4 could be true.
Once one makes these assumptions (and perhaps others that are implicit in my
argument), then it does seem to me that the plausible existence of God as the
Creator of our universe follows. Of course, the existence of God does not depend
on these assumptions; God could exist even if one or more of these assumptions
are false, just as I personally believe in His existence while being highly sceptical
of one or more of the assumptions of nearly all of the classical arguments for the
existence of God. But I do think that the Optimal Argument for the Existence of
God gives a somewhat new slant on why it might be plausible to believe in God.
Furthermore, although one can do a Bayesian analysis for theories of our universe
itself without reference to God, postulating the existence of God might help explain
certain features of our best theories of our universe, such as why they are enormously
more simple than they might have been but yet do not seem nearly so simple as
what is purely logically possible.
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11 Conclusions
I propose that in a Bayesian analysis in which the probability of a particular ob-
servation is used as the likelihood of the theory, the sum of the probabilities of all
observations should be unity.
It seems plausible that one can find cosmological theories that avoid Boltzmann
brain domination and explain the high order of our observations, though the measure
problem is not yet solved.
The best theories do not seem to be the absolute simplest, so presumably some-
thing other than simplicity is maximized, such as goodness. The best explanation
for the actual world may be that it is the best possible world. This assumption, with
suitable assumptions about God’s nature, such as love of mathematical elegance and
of sentient beings, leads to the Optimal Argument for the Existence of God:
The world may maximize goodness only by including a God whose appreciation
of the elegant universe and sentient beings He created overbalances the sufferings
within the universe.
12 Acknowledgments
For my work on prior probabilities and likelihoods, on the measure problem of
cosmology, on the death of Born’s rule, and on the Boltzmann brain problem, I
have benefited from discussions with many colleagues, including Andy Albrecht,
Tom Banks, Raphael Bousso, Adam Brown, Steven Carlip, Sean Carroll, Brandon
Carter, Willy Fischler, Ben Freivogel, Gary Gibbons, Steve Giddings, Daniel Harlow,
Jim Hartle, Stephen Hawking, Simeon Hellerman, Thomas Hertog, Gary Horowitz,
Ted Jacobson, Shamit Kachru, Matt Kleban, Stefan Leichenauer, Juan Maldacena,
Don Marolf, Yasunori Nomura, Joe Polchinski, Steve Shenker, Eva Silverstein, Mark
Srednicki, Rafael Sorkin, Douglas Stanford, Andy Strominger, Lenny Susskind, Bill
Unruh, Erik Verlinde, Herman Verlinde, Aron Wall, Nick Warner, and Edward Wit-
ten. Face-to-face conversations with Gary Gibbons, Jim Hartle, Stephen Hawking,
Thomas Hertog, and others were enabled by the gracious hospitality of the Mitchell
family and Texas A & M University at a workshop at Great Brampton House, Here-
fordshire, England. My scientific research has been supported in part by the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
15
For my work on the Optimal Argument for the Existence of God and related
philosophical and theological ideas, I am indebted to conversations with David Al-
bert, Michael Almeida, Luke Barnes, John Barrow, Nicholas Beale, Andrew Briggs,
Peter Bussey, Bernard Carr, Sean Carroll, Brandon Carter, Khalil Chamcham,
Robin Collins, Gary Colwell, William Lane Craig, Paul Davies, Stanley Deser,
George Ellis, Peter Getzels, Shelly Goldstein, Stephen Hawking, Jim Holt, Colin
Humphreys, John Leslie, Barry Loewer, Klaas Kraay, Robert Lawrence Kuhn,
Robert Mann, David Marshall, Thomas Nagel, Elliot Nelson, Timothy O’Conner,
Cathy Page, Jason Pollack, Joel Primack, Carlo Rovelli, Simon Saunders, Michael
Schrynemakers, Richard Swinburne, Donald Turner, AronWall, Christopher Weaver,
David Wilkinson, William Wootters, Dean Zimmerman, Henrik Zinkernagel, and
Anna Zytkow. This does not by any means imply that all or any of these people
agree with my ideas; I have perhaps benefited most from those who have expressed
sharp disagreement.
References
[1] A. D. Linde and A. Mezhlumian, “Stationary Universe,” Phys. Lett. B 307, 25
(1993) [gr-qc/9304015].
[2] A. Vilenkin, “Predictions from Quantum Cosmology,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 846
(1995) [gr-qc/9406010].
[3] B. Freivogel, “Making Predictions in the Multiverse,” Class. Quant. Grav. 28,
204007 (2011) [arXiv:1105.0244 [hep-th]].
[4] D. N. Page, “Spacetime Average Density (SAD) Cosmological Measures,”
JCAP 1411, 038 (2014), arXiv:1406.0504 [hep-th].
[5] L. Dyson, M. Kleban and L. Susskind, “Disturbing Implications of a Cosmo-
logical Constant,” JHEP 0210, 011 (2002) [hep-th/0208013].
[6] A. Albrecht, “Cosmic Inflation and the Arrow of Time,” in Science and Ultimate
Reality: Quantum Theory, Cosmology, and Complexity, edited by J. D. Bar-
row, P. C. W. Davies, and C. L. Harper, Jr. (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004), pp. 363-401, [astro-ph/0210527].
[7] D. N. Page, “Is Our Universe Likely to Decay within 20 Billion Years?,” Phys.
Rev. D 78, 063535 (2008) [hep-th/0610079].
[8] D. N. Page, “Is Our Universe Decaying at an Astronomical Rate?,” Phys. Lett.
B 669, 197 (2008) [hep-th/0612137].
16
[9] D. N. Page, “Sensible Quantum Mechanics: Are Only Perceptions Probabilis-
tic?” quant-ph/9506010.
[10] D. N. Page, “Attaching Theories of Consciousness to Bohmian Quantum Me-
chanics,” quant-ph/9507006.
[11] D. N. Page, “Sensible Quantum Mechanics: Are Probabilities Only in the
Mind?” Int. J. Mod. Phys. D 5, 583 (1996) [gr-qc/9507024].
[12] D. N. Page, “Quantum Cosmology Lectures,” gr-qc/9507028.
[13] D. N. Page, “Mindless Sensationalism: A Quantum Framework for Con-
sciousness,” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by
Q. Smith and A. Jokic (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 468-506,
quant-ph/0108039.
[14] D. N. Page, “Predictions and Tests of Multiverse Theories,” in Universe or
Multiverse?, edited by B. J. Carr (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2007), pp. 411-429 [hep-th/0610101].
[15] D. N. Page, “Consciousness and the Quantum,” arXiv:1102.5339 [quant-ph].
[16] D. N. Page, “Insufficiency of the Quantum State for Deducing Observational
Probabilities,” Phys. Lett. B 678, 41 (2009) [arXiv:0808.0722 [hep-th]].
[17] D. N. Page, “The Born Rule Dies,” JCAP 0907, 008 (2009) [arXiv:0903.4888
[hep-th]].
[18] D. N. Page, “Born Again,” arXiv:0907.4152 [hep-th].
[19] D. N. Page, “Born’s Rule Is Insufficient in a Large Universe,” arXiv:1003.2419
[hep-th].
[20] D. N. Page, “Cosmological Measures without Volume Weighting,” JCAP 0810,
025 (2008) [arXiv:0808.0351 [hep-th]].
[21] D. N. Page, “Cosmological Measures with Volume Averaging,” Int. J. Mod.
Phys. Conf. Ser. 01, 80 (2011).
[22] D. N. Page, “Agnesi Weighting for the Measure Problem of Cosmology,” JCAP
1103, 031 (2011) [arXiv:1011.4932 [hep-th]].
[23] D. N. Page, “Symmetric-Bounce Quantum State of the Universe,” JCAP 0909,
026 (2009) [arXiv:0907.1893 [hep-th]].
[24] D. N. Page, “The Everett Multiverse and God,” in K. Kraay, ed. “God and the
Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives,” Routledge
Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Book 10), London: Routledge (2014),
arXiv:1212.5608 [physics.gen-ph].
17
